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This study tested the hypothesis that a generally enhanced threat-confirming 
reasoning style would set people at risk for the development of anxiety 
disorders. Therefore, a non-clinical student sample (N = 146) was presented 
with a series of linear syllogisms referring to threatening and safety themes and 
with the anxiety subscale of the SCL-90 and trait anxiety in order to correlate 
reasoning with anxiety. Half of the syllogisms’ conclusions were in line and half 
were in conflict with generally believable threat and safety related convictions 
(e.g., potassium cyanide is more toxic than Tylenol; The Netherlands are safer 
than Afghanistan). For each type of syllogism, half was logically valid and half 
invalid. Overall, participants showed a clear interference of believability on 
logical reasoning, which is known as the belief bias effect. Furthermore, in line 
with the idea that people are generally characterised by a better safe than sorry 
strategy, the pattern indicated that the participants took more time to solve 
invalid threat related syllogisms as well as valid safety related syllogisms. This 
threat-confirming belief bias was however not especially pronounced in 
participants reporting relatively intense anxiety symptoms. Thus, the present 
findings do not lend support to the idea that a generally enhanced threat-
confirming belief bias is a diathesis for the development of anxious 
psychopathology. 
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Introduction 
Dysfunctional beliefs are assumed to play an important role in the acquisition 
and persistence of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, 1976; McNally, 2001). A striking 
feature of these dysfunctional beliefs is that they are both stable and irrational 
(i.e. that they are unhealthy and mostly even untrue). Why do patients hold on 
to unhealthy beliefs that are not in accordance with the empirical world? 
 Recently it has been proposed that individual differences in common 
deductive reasoning patterns may be involved in the development and/or 
persistence of irrational fears (e.g., Smeets & de Jong, 2002, September). 
Modifying (irrational) beliefs in the face of disconfirming evidence requires that 
people deduce the logical implications of the evidence for the validity of their 
beliefs. It is well documented that, in general, people have a tendency to endorse 
conclusions that are in line with their prior beliefs as valid and those that are in 
conflict with their view as invalid (“belief bias”; e.g., Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 
1993). The stronger this tendency, the more people will be liable to not 
correcting their prior beliefs. In other words, a strong “belief bias” may act in a 
way to immunize against refutation of once acquired (e.g., anxiogenic) beliefs. To 
the extent that anxiogenic convictions are critically involved in anxiety 
disorders, individuals with an enhanced belief bias would be at risk for 
developing such disorder. 
 The interference of believability with logical reasoning (i.e. belief bias) is 
commonly measured using a syllogistic reasoning task (e.g., Evans, Newstead et 
al., 1993), in which participants are instructed to judge as quickly as possible 
the logical validity of syllogisms consisting of two statements (the premises) and 
a conclusion. Logical validity refers to the necessity of a conclusion, assuming 
that the premises are true. If it is true that ‘A is faster than B’ and that ‘B is 
faster than C’, it follows that ‘A must be faster than C’. Logical validity would be 
violated when one concludes that ‘C is faster than A’ based on the given 
premises. When judging the validity, participants are instructed to ignore the 
believability of the conclusions. Believability refers to the meaning of the 
syllogism’s conclusion. Thus, participants have to judge whether a syllogism is 
logically valid, while ignoring its meaning. An example of a generally believable 
conclusion would be: ‘A tree is larger than a plant’, whereas ‘a plant is larger 
than a tree’ represents an example of a generally unbelievable conclusion. A 
valid yet unbelievable syllogism would be as follows: 
 
Premise 1  A plant is larger than a bush 
Premise 2  A bush is larger than a tree  





People are typically faster in reaching a decision about the validity of a 
syllogism when there is a match than when there is a mismatch between the 
validity and believability of the conclusion. This is known as the belief bias 
effect (cf. e.g., Evans, Newstead et al., 1993). The syllogistic reasoning task 
measures how people evaluate the validity of prior beliefs in light of (new and 
possibly disconfirming) information. The belief is represented in the conclusion 
of the syllogisms, and the data/information on which the reasoning takes place 
are represented in the premises.  
 The beliefs for which belief bias has been found generally concern beliefs that 
are in accordance with the empirical world or with prejudice (e.g., elephants are 
larger than mice, de Jong, Weertman, Horselenberg, & van den Hout [1997]; 
some Muslims are terrorists, Blanchette, Richards, Melnyk, & Lavda, [2007]), 
whereas beliefs of anxiety disorder patients concern untrue beliefs. This could 
well be an indication that patients suffering from anxiety disorder indeed have 
more difficulty separating logical truth from believable truth. In line with the 
hypothesis that a generally enhanced belief bias is a diathesis for the 
development of irrational fears, there is tentative evidence that spider phobic 
individuals show a stronger belief bias regarding universal convictions (e.g., 
elephants are larger than mice) than non-phobic controls (de Jong, Weertman et 
al., 1997). Yet, a subsequent study in a non-clinical sample failed to find a 
correlation between the strength of belief bias regarding universal convictions 
and symptoms of anxiety and depression (Smeets & de Jong, 2005). It should be 
noted that this study focused on universal beliefs regarding emotionally neutral 
themes. Conceptually similar work on other cognitive biases (such as attentional 
bias) has shown that the mood (or valence) of the materials that are used can be 
an important moderator. For instance, the relationship between attentional bias 
and psychopathology is particularly evident in negatively valenced materials 
(e.g., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, & Merckelbach, 
1995). In a similar vein, it might well be that enhanced belief bias regarding 
emotionally relevant rather than neutral themes might be especially relevant 
for the development of psychopathological symptoms. Therefore, in the present 
study we added syllogisms concerning emotionally valenced materials. More 
specifically, given the overly threatening content of the convictions of anxiety 
patients, this study focused on syllogisms regarding generally threatening 
themes and tested the relationship between the strength of a generally 
enhanced belief bias regarding threatening themes and symptoms of anxiety 
disorders in a non-clinical sample. If indeed generally enhanced belief bias 
regarding threatening themes sets people at risk for developing anxiety 
disorders, the relationship between belief bias and anxiety symptoms should 
also be evident in the preclinical range.  
 




Participants (N = 146, 48 male and 98 female) were undergraduate students of 
various faculties (e.g., psychology, n = 84, medicine, n = 17, pedagogy, n = 10). 
The mean age was 20.7 years (SD = 2.89). The participating psychology students 
received course credits, the other students received a small financial reward.  
 
Materials and apparatus 
Belief bias task 
Belief bias was measured using a computerized syllogistic reasoning task. 
Participants were asked to judge as quickly as possible the logical validity of 
syllogisms. The presented syllogisms varied in logical validity and in 
believability of the conclusions. A belief bias effect is found when participants 
find it relatively easy to judge valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable 
syllogisms (i.e., when there is a match between validity and believability) and 
relatively difficult to judge the logical validity of valid-unbelievable and invalid-
believable syllogisms (i.e., when there is a mismatch). An example of a syllogism 
varying in validity and believability is presented in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 
Example of a linear syllogisms varying in believability and logical status. 
 Believable conclusion Unbelievable conclusion 
 
valid 
An elephant is bigger than a dog 
A dog is bigger than a mouse 
An elephant is bigger than a mouse 
 
A mouse is bigger than a dog 
A dog is bigger than an elephant 
A mouse is bigger than an elephant 
 
invalid 
A mouse is bigger than a dog 
A dog is bigger than an elephant 
An elephant is bigger than a mouse 
An elephant is bigger than a dog 
A dog is bigger than a mouse 
A mouse is bigger than an elephant 
 
 
The syllogistic reasoning task used in the current experiment involves the 
evaluation of a given conclusion. This was done to mimic the way information is 
processed in daily life: The premises contain the data (viz. the experiences that 
provide the information that is either in line or in contrast with a given belief), 
and the conclusions represent beliefs the participants hold (or do not hold, in the 
case of unbelievable conclusions). Through the use of top down processing, 
participants need to evaluate whether the conclusion (viz. their belief) holds 
(viz. logically follows from) in face of the presented data/information. 
 We used both generally believable neutral and generally believable 




emotional stimuli: It seems reasonable to assume that people who are liable to 
reason in a confirmatory style in light of threat-related information are at risk 
for the consolidation of anxiogenic beliefs. The same holds for discarding safety 
information as a result of a diminished safety-confirming belief bias. Both a 
surplus of threat-confirming reasoning and/or a lack of safety-confirming 
reasoning may strengthen the predisposition for the development of symptoms 
of anxiety disorders. 
 The computerized syllogistic reasoning task was adapted from Smeets and de 
Jong (2005) and extended with themes from the domain of threat (e.g., 
‘potassium cyanide is more toxic than Tylenol) and safety (e.g., ‘The Netherlands 
are safer than Afghanistan’), see the Appendix for a complete list of the 
syllogisms used. The neutral themes were adjusted to correct for length of 
sentences. There were 4 different topics within each domain, resulting in 12 
topics. Each topic was presented in a valid-believable, an invalid-unbelievable, a 
valid-unbelievable and an invalid-believable type. Every syllogism was 
presented in two orders (a > b, b > c, therefore a > c and b > c, a > b, therefore a 
> c) to counter possible reading-strategies (cf. Smeets & de Jong, 2005).  
 In total, 96 syllogisms were presented in two blocks of 48. The blocks were 
separated by a 30-second break. The stimuli were presented in a fixed random 
order with some restrictions: topic should differ with every stimulus 
presentation, type of syllogism should differ after a maximum of two stimulus 
presentations, and order should differ after a maximum of three stimulus 
presentations. The outcome measures were reaction time (RT) and amount of 
errors. 
Believability check 
To confirm that the syllogisms that were defined as ‘believable’ were indeed 
believable, the participants were asked to rate the alleged believable conclusions 
of all the syllogisms used in the syllogistic reasoning task3. These conclusions 
were presented as statements on the computer screen. Four statements were 
presented per screen, and each statement had to be rated on a visual analogue 
scale (VAS) ranging from ‘unbelievable’ to ‘believable’. Each VAS was presented 
directly under the statement. Using the mouse, participants could click on a 
position on the line for their answer, and could change the position of their 
answer if desired. The VASs were 17 cm in length, but the responses of the 
participants were rescaled into a 0-100 range. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Due to miscommunication, a last minute change in one of the syllogisms was not carried 
through in the believability check. Therefore, the syllogism ‘a scrape is more innocent than a 
heart attack’ from the safety domain was not rated on believability. 
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Anxiety symptoms 
We used the Anxiety (ANX) subscale of the Dutch version of the Symptom 
Checklist, an index for anxiety symptoms (SCL-90, Arrindell & Ettema, 2003). 
Internal consistency was satisfactory (α = .76).  
Trait anxiety 
Trait anxiety was measured with a Dutch version of the STAI-T (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) (i.e., ZBV, van der Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 
1980), consisting of 20 self-statements which can be rated on a scale of 1 (almost 
never) to 4 (almost always). High scores indicate high trait anxiety. Test-retest 
reliability shows that the ZBV is a stable measure of trait anxiety (r = .75 for 
both male and female students over a period of 4 months). Internal consistency 
in the current sample was good (α = .90). 
Depression questionnaire 
To test the alleged specificity of enhanced belief bias for threatening information 
as a diathesis for the development of anxiety symptoms we also included the 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CES-D). The CES-D is a 
self-report questionnaire designed to measure depressive symptoms in 
community-samples. It consists of 20 items concerning feelings and behaviours 
over the past week which can be rated on a scale from 0 (seldom or never) to 3 
(mostly or always), resulting in a range of 0 – 60 with 60 indicating extreme 
depressive symptoms (Bouma, Ranchor, Sandermans, & Van Sonderen, 1995). 
Internal consistency proved to be good in the current sample (α = .88).  
Rigidity 
As a subsidiary issue, we tested whether belief bias is related to rigidity. It 
seems plausible to argue that an information-processing style that neglects 
available disconfirming information is a representation of the more general 
personality characteristic rigidity. We therefore included a subscale of the NPV 
(Nederlandse Persoonlijkheids Vragenlijst [Dutch Personality Questionnaire], 
Luteijn, Starren, & Van Dijk, 2000) as a measure of trait rigidity in our study. 
The rigidity-scale (RG) of the NPV consists of 25 self-statements (e.g., ‘once I 
have made a decision, I stick to it’) that can be scored as ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’ or 
‘?’. High scores (frequent use of ‘correct’) indicate a need to have things going as 
planned, fixed habits and principles, and sometimes intellectual rigidity. 
Internal consistency was fair in the current sample (α = .73). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in small groups of between 1 and 7 individuals. After 
filling out an informed consent form, they were asked to start the syllogistic 
reasoning task. Participants were instructed to judge the validity of the 




‘NO’ key on the left side or a green ‘YES’ key on the right side of the keyboard. 
Participants were given four practice items with feedback on the correctness of 
their response. Further explanation on the validity of the conclusion was given 
for the first and second practice items. Instructions were repeated at the start of 
the second block.  
 Each stimulus was preceded by a blank screen (500 ms) and a screen reading 
‘pay attention!’ (1500 ms). Each stimulus disappeared as soon as a response was 
given with a maximum of a 20-second delay before the response was coded 
‘incorrect’. No feedback was given during the test-phase.  
 After having completed the reasoning task, the participants completed a 
second reasoning task (for pilot purposes; these will not be discussed in this 
paper) and the believability check, after which the participants filled out the 
questionnaires in a fixed order: SCL-90, CES-D, STAI-T and NPV.  
 
Data analysis 
Participants, distribution of anxiety symptoms 
The distribution of anxiety symptoms was explored by calculating the means 
and standard deviations of the various scales of the current sample. These were 
compared with the Dutch normal population norm groups of the various 
questionnaires by means of independent sample t-tests. 
Believability check 
The believability ratings were averaged for each domain. The ratings for the 
three domains were compared by means of a repeated measures ANOVA with 
domain as within subject factor. Also, correlations between the believability 
ratings and the anxiety and depression measures were calculated. 
Belief bias and anxiety symptoms 
Per cell of the design, a single reaction time score was calculated by averaging 
the median scores of the two blocks of the belief bias task. Only correct 
responses were included in the calculation of the RT scores. The RT scores were 
normalized using a square root transformation. The normalized mean median 
reaction times scores will from here on be referred to as RTs. For the errors, the 
sum of errors over the two blocks was computed, again per cell of the design. 
 In line with previous research we computed belief bias summary scores (BB 
scores). For each domain a separate BB score was computed by subtracting RTs 
for the matched syllogisms from the RTs for mismatched syllogisms (viz. BB = 
[valid-unbelievable + invalid-believable] – [valid-believable + invalid-
unbelievable]). The BB scores for errors were calculated in a similar vein.  
 Prior to exploring the relationship between belief bias and psychopathology, 
we checked whether belief bias was indeed present by means of two repeated 
measures ANOVA’s with domain (neutral, threat, safety) as within subject 
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factor and BB score for RTs and errors as dependent variables. We looked for a 
significant deviation from zero for the intercept. In addition, we explored the 
differences between the domains. When present, we further explored these 
differences by interpreting the observed scores.  
 Because we compared BB scores comprised of within subject interactions 
(validity*believability), there was no need to correct for length of sentences 
within the analyses (the syllogisms within each interaction were of equal length 
due to the design of the task). 
 The six BB scores (3 domains * 2 outcome measures) were correlated with 
the measures of anxiety, depression and rigidity. If correlations between the 
believability ratings and the psychopathology measures are present, we will 
repeat the belief bias – psychopathology correlational analyses while correcting 
for the potential influences of these believability ratings. 




Participants, distribution of psychopathological symptoms 
Observed means, standard deviations and range as well as norm group statistics 
are displayed in Table 2.2. No differences occurred between man and woman for 
ANX, STAI, CES-D or RG (multivariate F(4,139) = 1.14, p = .34, all univariate 
tests were also non-significant, with high p-values). The observed means did not 
differ from the Dutch normal subjects (norm group II) for ANX (t(2234) =            
-0.0010, p >.10; Arrindell & Ettema, 2003). For ANX, four participants (2.8%) 
scored in the category ‘very high’ of the normal population norm group as well as 
the ‘average’ category of the out-patient psychiatric norm group.  
 The observed mean for the STAI-T did not differ from the Dutch normal 
subjects, t(549) = -.0500, p > .10 (norm group ‘all students’; van der Ploeg et al., 
1980). Also, there were no differences between our sample and the selected norm 
groups for the CES-D (student norm group 3b t(418) = 0.06, p > .10; general 
sample norm group 2a t(2705) = 0.01, p >.10).  
 
Believability check 
On average, all domains were considered highly believable. The mean 
believability rating for the neutral conclusions was 95.32 (SD = 8.43), for the 
safety conclusions was 94.51 (SD = 6.54) and for the threat conclusions was 
95.12 (SD = 6.79). The repeated measures ANOVA with domain as within 
subject factor and believability rating as outcome measure showed that these 
believability scores do not significantly differ, F(2,143) = 0.90, p = .41. On 




Believability for the safety domain was negatively correlated with trait anxiety 
as measured by the STAI-T (r = -.21, p = .01), and marginally significantly 
correlated with generalized anxiety as measured by the ANX subscale (r = -.15, 
p = .07). The higher trait anxiety or generalized anxiety (respectively), the less 
believable the safety related conclusions were perceived. Also, believability for 
the threat domain were marginally significantly and negatively correlated with 
trait anxiety (STAI-T, r = -.16, p = .07). The higher trait anxiety, the less 
believable the threat related conclusions were perceived. Other correlations 
proved to be non-significant.  
 
Table 2.2 
Means, standard deviations, range and N for ANX, STAI-T, CES-D,  
and RG for the current sample as well as for the various norm groups.  
 ANX STAI-T CES-D NPV-RG 
Current sample  
M  12.78 33.40 8.76 27.97 
SD 3.14 8.35 7.29 7.00 
range 10 - 29 20 - 64 0 – 37 34 - 73 
N 144 144 144 144 
Norm group sample 
M  12.83 36.9 8.3 * 
SD 4.39 6.13 8.5 * 
N 2092 407 276 * 
* No norm group available comparable to current sample.  
Note. For norm group data see Arrindell & Ettema (2003) for ANX,  
see van der Ploeg et al. (1980) for STAI-T, and see Bouma et al. (1995)  
for CES-D. 
 
Belief bias and anxiety symptoms 
The repeated measures ANOVA for RT BB scores with domain as within subject 
factor revealed a significant deviation from zero of the intercept, F(1,139) = 
44.22, p < .01, η2 = .24. In addition, a significant effect of domain was present 
(F[2,138] = 6.93, p < .01, η2 = .05). Post hoc analyses showed that neutral BB 
scores were significantly higher than threat and safety BB scores (repeated 
measures ANOVA with neutral and threat as domains: F[1,139] = 11.57, p < .01, 
η2 = .08; repeated measures ANOVA with neutral and safety as domains: 
F[1,139] = 8.62, p < .01, η2 = .06) and that the BB scores for threat and safety 
did not differ significantly from each other (repeated measures ANOVA with 
threat and safety as domains: F(1,139) = 0.24, p =.63). The observed (square 
rooted mean median) RTs for the various cells of the design are displayed in 
Figure 2.1. When looking at the observed RTs (Figure 2.1), it can be seen that 
the belief bias effect is most pronounced for neutral materials. Furthermore, the 
influence of believability on reasoning performance is markedly stronger for 
Threat-confirming belief bias and symptoms of anxiety disorders 
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invalid syllogisms when it comes to threat related materials and stronger for 
valid syllogisms when it comes to safety related materials. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Square root normalized mean median RT (ms) on neutral, threat and safety 
















Note: Post hoc analyses showed that the domain*believability interaction is significant 
(F[2,138] = 10.88, p < .01, η2 = .14) but is due to the believability ratings of the syllogisms 
(domain*believability interaction with believability rating as covariate, (F[2,134] = 0.71, p = 
.49) instead of a true difference of how believability is treated over the various domains. 
 
 
The error data showed considerable variability. Overall, participants differed 
substantially in how many errors they made. Also, the amount of errors differed 
over the various cells of the design. The BB scores as well as the scores of which 
they are comprised can be seen in Table 2.3. There seems to be a belief bias 
effect for errors on all three domains. Indeed, the repeated measures ANOVA for 
error BB scores with domain as within subject factor revealed a significant 
deviation from zero of the intercept, F(1,143) = 17.95, p < .01, η2 = .11. No 
significant differences over domains occurred, F(1,143) = 1.82, p =.17. The belief 
bias as measured on errors was equally strong for all domains. 
 All the above-mentioned analyses were repeated with gender as between 
















































Table 2.3  
Mean (and SD) belief bias scores (BB scores) for the amount of errors per domain, and the mean 
amount of errors (and SD) per syllogism type, of which the BB scores are comprised. 
 Neutral Threat Safety 
BB score 0.83 (2.74) 0.66 (2.60) 0.99 (2.56) 
 believable unbelievable believable unbelievable believable unbelievable 


























The BB scores for the neutral, threat and safety domain were correlated with 
ANX, STAI-T, CES-D and RG scores. The correlations are shown in Table 2.4. 
None of the correlations reached significance at α = .054. We repeated the 
correlational analysis, partialing out the potential influence of the believability 
ratings of the specific domains. The correlations for threat related belief bias 
and measures of anxiety and depression, when corrected for the threat 
believability ratings, proved to be non-significant. The results were similar for 
safety belief bias when correcting for the safety believability ratings, and for 
neutral belief bias when correcting for the neutral believability ratings. 
 
Table 2.4 
Correlations between neutral, threat- and safety-related belief bias (BB), ANX, STAI-T, CES-D 
and RG. 
 RT errors 
 BB_neutral BB_threat BB_safety BB_neutral BB_threat BB_safety 
ANX  .05 -.09 -.13 -.04  .00  .00 
STAI-T -.09 -.06 -.08 -.01 -.08 -.04 
CES-D  .00  .00 -.15  .00 -.05 -.03 
RG  .03 -.03  .06 -.10 -.08 -.06 




This study was designed to investigate the potential predisposing role of threat-
confirming reasoning for the development of anxiety disorders. We used a non-
clinical sample that was comparable to other non-clinical samples on all 
measures of psychopathology. Firstly, as expected, there was a clear belief bias 
                                                 
4 The BB scores were computed in a different way than Smeets and de Jong (2005) did. We used 
difference-scores whereas Smeets and de Jong used ratios. We repeated our analysis using BB 
ratios. Results were similar to those reported above. 
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effect for neutral materials. The slower responses of participants on trials for 
which the believability is in contrast with the logical validity are in line with the 
idea of a dual-process theory for belief bias: Initially, the syllogism is processed 
by the implicit, automatic, associative system (System 1). When a conflict in 
believability and logical validity is detected, the explicit, rational system 
(System 2) overrides the initial processing and engages in deliberate reasoning 
(cf. Evans, 2003): The primary response initiated by System 1 is located in the 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex, associated with intuitive affective processing. 
When the conflict within the stimulus is detected, the right lateral prefrontal 
cortex, associated with logical reasoning, is involved in the inhibition of this 
primary response and will create a logically correct response (Goel & Dolan, 
2003). This route of processing takes more time, and thus results in slower 
responses. 
 Secondly, as predicted, participants also showed a threat-confirming belief 
bias. Participants were slower and made more errors when there was a 
mismatch between validity and believability. Interestingly, the 
validity*believability interaction patterns for the threat and the safety themes 
are consistent with the adaptive conservatism bias (Hendersen, 1985): In line 
with the idea that it is adaptive to be especially reluctant to falsify danger 
signals (cf. de Jong, Mayer, & van den Hout, 1997), participants had greater 
difficulty distinguishing believability from logical validity only on invalid trials 
when the content was threat related. The confirmation of danger seems to have 
priority over the confirmation of beliefs: Only when it was not dangerous to 
make a mistake in logical reasoning performance (viz. when one is not about to 
erroneously deny danger) the influence of beliefs on reasoning became apparent. 
Thus participants’ responding as a function of validity and believability of the 
threat-related syllogisms (see Figure 1) matches the notion of belief bias and 
confirmation bias: Participants are generally quick in solving the syllogism 
when being valid or being unbelievable and invalid (a match between 
believability and validity). They are only slow when having to disconfirm danger 
(invalid) when the conclusion is believable (believable-invalid syllogisms). The 
opposite is true for safety themes: Here, the participants had great difficulty 
distinguishing believability from validity only on valid trials. Only when one is 
not about to erroneously accept safety information will beliefs influence 
reasoning performance. At first sight, it seems unexpected that participants are 
generally slower in solving invalid syllogisms (one would expect both the invalid 
and the believable-valid syllogisms to be solved more rapidly). This is however 
probably caused by the validity main effect: it is well known that participants 
generally find it more difficult to solve invalid than valid syllogisms (Evans, 




 Thirdly, although the participants generally displayed belief bias over all 
domains, there was considerable variation in the strength of these effects, which 
suggests that the present findings cover a sufficient range to be meaningfully 
related to the psychopathology variables. Contrary to expectations, the threat-
related belief bias effects were not only independent of depression, but also 
unrelated to the level of participants’ anxiety symptoms. Furthermore, belief 
bias was unrelated to the personality trait rigidity, indicating that the belief 
bias effect reflects something different than ‘just being rigid’.  
 Cognitive models of anxiety disorders underline the importance of 
dysfunctional beliefs in the aetiology of anxiety symptoms. In line with this 
there is ample evidence that anxiety disordered individuals indeed are 
characterized by inflated levels of believability for disorder-specific convictions. 
Treatment studies confirm the importance of anxiogenic beliefs in the 
generation of irrational fears by demonstrating that symptoms disappear by 
taking the edge off underlying beliefs (Arntz, 2003). Correcting (irrational) 
beliefs requires that people deduce the logical implications of disconfirming 
experiences (or information) for their beliefs. Building on this, we hypothesized 
that especially people who tend not to correct their somehow acquired 
convictions in the face of incompatible data/information would be at risk for 
developing persistent irrational beliefs. And since fear related beliefs are central 
to the development of anxiety disorders, it is people who generally tend to 
mistake believability for logical validity in the face of threat related concerns 
that are at risk for the development of these disorders. If threat-related belief 
bias is indeed a diathesis for the development of symptoms, a relationship 
between enhanced belief bias and symptoms of psychopathology should also be 
evident in the pre-clinical range. In a similar line of reasoning, we assumed that 
a reasoning style that ignores the validation of safety-information would also 
serve as a threat-confirming reasoning bias. In apparent contrast, there was no 
relationship between fear-confirming reasoning and anxiety symptoms. 
Consistent with the findings by Smeets and de Jong (2005), there was neither a 
relationship between generally enhanced (neutral) belief bias and 
psychopathological symptoms. Thus, the present findings lend no support to the 
idea that a generally enhanced threat-confirming belief bias sets people at risk 
for developing persistent anxiety symptoms. 
 It should be acknowledged however that there were some limitations to our 
study. A first remark concerns the use of an analogue sample. Although the 
current sample had a considerable range in both the anxiety symptom scores 
and the belief bias scores, it cannot be ruled out that we had an insufficient 
number of participants high on anxiety and/or extreme on belief bias to be able 
to show the alleged relationship.  
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 Second, the use of a student sample may have hampered the sensitivity of 
the belief bias task: Belief bias scores decrease with intelligence and with 
training in analytical reasoning (MacPherson & Stanovich, 2007 and Evans, 
Newstead, Allan, & Pollard, 1994, respectively), both of which are likely to be 
present in highly educated groups. We did however find strong interference 
effects of believability on logical reasoning in the current sample, which 
indicates that belief bias was present.  
 Finally and perhaps most important, it should be acknowledged that there 
was no experimental control over participants’ prior anxiogenic learning 
experiences in the current study. Obviously, belief bias can only promote the 
generation of psychopathological symptoms if there are experiences that could 
lead to irrational anxiogenic beliefs. Therefore, it might be helpful in future 
research to model the experience of aversive learning in a laboratory setting. 
One possibility would be to test for differential acquisition and extinction in 
high and low fear-confirming individuals in the context of an aversive 
conditioning paradigm. If enhanced fear-confirming belief bias is causally 
related to psychopathology, this should facilitate the acquisition of conditioned 
fear and/or delay of extinction effects. 
 The absence of a relationship between generally enhanced belief bias and 
symptoms of anxiety in the present study seems in apparent contrast with the 
finding by de Jong, Weertman et al. (1997). They found a generally enhanced 
belief bias effect in women with spider phobia irrespective of the domain of their 
concerns. In light of the present results these findings can therefore perhaps 
best be interpreted as representing a consequence rather than a cause of the 
disorder. This could potentially be caused by an anxiety-induced general sense 
of insecurity and stress. Scanning patterns may therefore become chaotic and 
individuals may leap into unjustified conclusions (e.g., Kienan, 1987). There is 
also evidence that working memory capacity is reduced in anxious individuals, 
which affects attention and the temporary storage and manipulation of 
information (e.g., Eysenck, 1985; MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Tohill & 
Holyoak, 2000). Following this, enhanced belief bias in highly anxious 
individuals may be the result of a restriction in the available working memory 
capacity. 
 Belief bias effects have been found in patients when reasoning with disorder-
specific syllogisms (see de Jong, Weertman et al., 1997). Since belief bias is 
commonly found for strongly held beliefs, it is not surprising that patients 
display belief bias when it comes to their strongly held psychopathological 
convictions. The present finding of the absence of a relationship between a 
neutral and/or threat related extreme belief bias and psychopathology 
symptoms provide no evidence for the notion that enhanced belief bias sets 




not imply that belief bias is irrelevant in psychopathology. Although probably 
not causal in the development of psychopathology, (disorder-specific) belief bias 
may still serve to maintain dysfunctional convictions once they are acquired. 
Through the maintenance of convictions, belief bias may logically help maintain 
psychopathological symptoms (cf. de Jong, Weertman et al., 1997) and may 
hamper treatment interventions through the non-integration of corrective 
experiences. To test these issues we are currently examining the malleability of 
belief bias following treatment and explore the role of residual belief bias in the 
return of fear at follow up. 
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An oak tree is larger than a rhododendron 
A rhododendron is larger than a dandelion 
An oak tree is larger than a dandelion 
 
An airplane is faster than a car 
A car is faster than a bicycle 
An airplane is faster than a bicycle 
 
A caravan is smaller than a mansion 
A mansion is smaller than a castle 
A caravan is smaller than a castle 
 
A shrew-mouse is smaller than a dog 
A dog is smaller than an African elephant 
A shrew-mouse is smaller than an African elephant 
 
Threat related syllogisms 
Lung cancer is more dangerous than a pneumonia 
Pneumonia is more dangerous than the flue 
Lung cancer is more dangerous than the flue 
 
A boa constrictor is more threatening than a rat 
A rat is more threatening than a mouse 
A boa constrictor is more threatening than a mouse 
 
A burn is more painful than a scrape 
A scrape is more painful than a mosquito sting 
A burn is more painful than a mosquito sting 
 
Potassium cyanide is more toxic than tar 
Tar is more toxic than Tylenol 
Potassium cyanide is more toxic than Tylenol 
 
Safety related syllogisms 
The Netherlands are safer than Russia 
Russia is safer than Afghanistan 
The Netherlands are safer than Afghanistan 
 
A crash helmet is safer than a cap 
A cap is safer than a bare head 






A scrape is more innocent than a fracture 
A fracture is more innocent than a heart attack 
A scrape is more innocent than a heart attack 
 
Travelling by train is safer than by car 
Travelling by car is safer than by motorcycle 
Travelling by train is safer than by motorcycle 
